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Recent Cases
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-SEARCH AND SEIZURE WITHOUT WARRANT AS AN

INCIDENT TO A LAWFUL ARREST
United States v. RabinowitzOn February 1, 1943, federal officers were informed that respondent was in
possession of a quantity of stamps bearing forged overprints. On February 6,
four such stamps were sold to a government agent Finally, on February 16, a warrant for respondents arrest was procured, and officers accompanied by stamp experts

1. 339 U. S. 56 (1950).
(319)
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went to his small office where he was found and arrested. The office was searched
for about an hour, and some 573 stamps were found. Timely motions to suppress
the evidence pertaining to the stamps were made, but all were denied. Respondent
was convicted of possessing and selling the stamps. The court of appeals reversed
the conviction and the supreme court granted certiorari.
Held: that as an incident to a lawful arrest, a search, without warrant, could
be made of the whole office, and the legality of the search is in no way affected by
the fact that there had been sufficient time in which to procure a search warrant.
This is the fourth amendment:
"The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers
and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by
oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched,
and the persons or things to be seized."
Though it is only unreasonable searches that are prohibited, 2 it can be said as a
general rule that a warrant is necessary to validate a search. The present case
deals with a long recognized exception to this rule; search without warrant incident
to lawful arrest.
The court expressly relies on the highly controversial case of Harris v. United
States3 as providing ample authority for holding valid a search of the extent here
made. In that case the petitioner was arrested in his four-room apartment and
an intensive five-hour search was made of all four rooms, during which a number
of selective service cards were found in a sealed envelope. He was convicted for
their unlawful possession even though the arrest and search had been for another
suspected crime. The Supreme Court upheld the conviction, reasoning that the
search might extend to the whole apartment which was in petitioner's "exclusive
possession" and "control." Further, that this was not a general exploratory search
since officers were honestly searching for forged checks which they reasonably believed were there, but that since the draft cards were government property, unlawful
to possess, they could be seized.
Both in this case and in the principal case the dissenting justices vigorously
condemn the judicial sanction of searches of such breadth. Justice Jackson apparently would limit the scope of permissible search to "the person arrested and
the objects upon him or in his immediate physical control." 4 In his dissenting
opinion in United States v. Rabiizowitz, Justice Frankfurter would impose the
same limits, and only allow that because of the necessity of protecting the officer,
preventing escape, and avoiding the destruction of evidence by the arrested person.5
The first clear statement by the Court which would seem to sanction a search
beyond these limits is found in Agnello v. United States.6 There a search, without
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

Carroll v. United States, 267 U. S. 132 (1925).
331 U. S.145 (1946).
Harris v. United States, swpra note 3.
United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U. S. 56 (1950).
269 U. S.20 (1925).
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warrant, of the home of one of the accused, several blocks from where the arrestwas made, was held unreasonable. In the course of the opinion, Mr. JusticeButler makes the statement that "the right without a search warrant contemporaneous to search persons lawfully arrested while committing crime and to search
the place where the arrest is made in order to find and seize things connected with,
the crime as the fruits or as the means by which it was committed, as well as.
weapons and other things to effect an escape from custody is not to be doubted."
7
As authority for this proposition the cases of Weeks v. United States and Carroll
v. United States8 are cited. The first of these-the famous Weeks case-held un-reasonable a search without warrant of the home of the defendant arrested elsewhere, much as in the Agnello case. During the course of the opinion recognition.
is made of the right to search the person of the accused and to seize the fruits or
evidence of crime, but nothing is found to support the broad contention of Justice
Butler. The same can be said of Carroll v. United States where a search of an,
automobile used to transport illegal liquor was upheld, partly because of the easilymovable nature of an automobile which would make the procurement of a warrant
difficult. Though the Court alludes to the long recognized right to search theperson, it in no way supports the contention that the place of arrest may bd.
searched as well. 9
It should be noted that though the statement in the Agnello case was not controlling in the result, it was often quoted and heavily relied upon as authorityin a great number of the state and lower federal decisions growing out of prohibition.1° These cases almost uniformly supported the validity of searches which
extended beyond the person of the accused or the surroundings under his immediate-

physical control.

Prior to this time, however, the most one authority can say

in regard to the scope of permissible search is "the cases do not so clearly define
how far an officer may go, in searching the room, premises or effects of the person

arrested.""
The next case of interest is Marron v. United Statesl- where prohibition agentsraided a speakeasy with a valid search warrant entitling them to search for "intoxicating liquor and articles for their manufacture." They arrested a bartenderin the process of selling drinks, and proceeded to search the place. In a closet in
which they found a quantity of liquor they also found a ledger showing entries of an
incriminating nature. The trial court refused to suppress the evidence pertainingto the ledger, which action was affirmed by the Supreme Court. It was held that7. 232 U. S. 383 (1913).
8. Supra, note 2.
9. In his dissent in the principle case, Justice Frankfurter points out that
"These decisions do not justify todays decision. They merely prove how a hintbecomes a suggestion, is loosely turned into dictum and finally elevated to a de-cision."
10. See cases collected in notes, 32 A.L.R. 680 (1924), 51 A.L.R. 424 (1927),
74 A.L.R. 1337 (1931), 84 A.L.R. 782 (1933).
11. CORNELIUS, SEARCHES AND SEIZURES § 38 (1926).
12. 275 U. S.192 (1927).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1951
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though the ledger could not be taken under the warrant in which it was not speciLed, it could be taken as an incident to the lawful arrest of the bartender, who was
at the time committing a crime in the presence of the arresting officers. The Court
relied upon Agnelo v. United States and stated the rule to be this: "The authority
-of the officers to search and seize the things by which the nuisance was being maintained extended to all parts of the premises used for the unlawful purpose."
The broad holding of this decision was explained, if not limited, a few years
14
8
later in Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States' and United States v. LefkowitZ.
Both cases condemned general exploratory searches which were attempted to be
justified by lawful arrest. Justice Butler distinguished his former opinion in that
there a crime was openly being committed in the presence of the officers, while
this was not so in either the Go-Bart or Lefkowitz cases. Furthermore "the ledger
and bills being in plain view were picked up by the officers as an incident of the
arrest.' 5 No search for them was made." Thus explained Marron v. United States
means no more than that arresting officers may seize fruits and instruments of
crime visible to them when making the arrest. This is a right long recognized
and is something entirely different from search.16 Harris v. United States therefore
stands as the first case to sanction in its result a search of greater breadth than
that held allowable by Mr. Justice Jackson. 17
The case of Trupiano, v. United States's followed by McDonald v. United
States"9 introduces a novel proposition which raised a major obstacle in the path
of the majority in the principal case. Federal officers had kept under careful surveillance for some time the operation of an illegal distillery. When a raid was
made it was done without the procurement of a warrant of any kind. The distillery
was operated in a barn on premises owned by a farmer who was acting in conjunction with the officers, and who admitted them to the premises. Peering into the
barn they discovered one of the defendants operating the apparatus. They entered,
arrested him, and seized the equipment, apparently all of which was in plain sight.
13. 282 U. S. 344 (1931).
14. 285 U. S. 452 (1931).
15. This statement seems hard to justify in view of the language employed
to state the facts in the previous case. "They searched for and found large quantities of liquor, some of which were in a closet. While in the closet, they noticed
a ledger showing inventories ... and other things related to the business." Justice
Butler appears to have been careless either in his description, or in his interpretation of the facts. A ledger found while in a closet hardly would be in plain view
at the time of arrest, considering the rest of the facts stated.
16. CORNELIUS, SEARCHES AND SEIZURES § 38 (1926).
17. The case of Davis v. United States, 328 U. S. 582, decided in 1946, held
valid a search, without warrant, of a filling station office. Defendant had been
arrested, in front of the station, for selling gasoline without ration stamps, and the
search was made in order to discover illegally possessed extra stamps. However,
the determination was made on the grounds of the district court's findings as to
consent by the accused. The court refused to otherwise consider the question as to
the reasonableness of the search.
18. 334 U. S. 699 (1948).
19. 335 U. S.451 (1948).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol16/iss3/8
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The Supreme Court held that the seizure was bad because of the failure of the
officers to procure a search warrant when it was reasonably practicable to do so.
Hence, even though a lawful arrest was made, a search or seizure made incident
thereto would be unconstitutional if there had been time prior to the arrest to
procure a search warrant. A similar result is reached in McDonald v. United States
where police officers, having gained access to the common hallway in a tenement
house, observed a lottery in operation through a transom. They entered, made
an arrest, and seized the machines, slips and money being used. As the principal
case points out, this is a rule of easy application. However, they refuse to apply
it and expressly overrule Trupiano v. United States in so far as it would make the
practicability of procuring a search warrant the only test.
It is certainly desirable to have magistrates or judges rather than police officers
determining when searches and seizures are permissible and what limitations should
be placed upon such activities. 20 Undoubtedly an unauthorized search or seizure
without contemporaneous arrest is bad whether or not the officers had time to
procure a warrant.21 In Johnson v. United States, Justice Jackson dwells long and
earnestly on the desirability of requiring the procurement of a warrant when at all
practicable, but the case is decided on other grounds. Similar statements can be
found in other cases,22 but in no case prior to Trupiano v. United States has a
search incident to an arrest .been held bad solely because the arresting officer had
time to procure a search warrant.
As is said in the principal case, it is unreasonable searches that are prohibited
by the fourth amendment, and "that criterion in turn depends upon the facts and
circumstances-the total atmosphere of the case."2 3 Is it correct to say that every
search and seizure without warrant made at the time of arrest would be unreasonable when it was practicable for the arresting officers to also procure a search
warrant? It wasn't required in Harris v. United States where the arrest was made
under warrant. If there was time to procure an arrest warrant, there was also time
to procure a search warrant. That case therefore has been considered as having
been overruled by the Trupiano decision. Perhaps the Trupiano ruling had a salutary effect, in that officers would almost always find it necessary to procure a
search warrant. Even when an unexpected arrest was made at the scene of a crime
it could be contended that a search should be postponed until a warrant was obtained except where absolutely necessary according to the guides set forth by Justice
Frankfurter. 24 But what of the long recognized right to seize fruits and instrumentalities of crime when found at the scene of arrest? Such right would be
seriously limited by the rule as applied in the Trupiano and McDonald cases.
20. Trupiano v. United States, supra, note 18; United States v. Lefkowitz,
supra note 14; Johnson v. United States, 333 U. S.10 (1948).
21. Taylor v. United States, 286 U. S.1 (1932).
22. Go-Bart v. United States, supra note 13, Carroll v. United States, supra,
note 2.
23. United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U. S. 56, 66 (1950).
24. Supra note S.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1951
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Certainly the practicability of procuring a search warrant is one thing to be considered in determining the reasonableness of a search or seizure. United States v.
Rabinowitz does not preclude the consideration of this factor. It only denies that
it is the sole and controlling test.
How then do matters stand? Apparently Harris v. United States has been'
shorn of any cloud which may have been cast upon it by later decisions. It
would seem therefore that a search incident to a lawful arrest may extend beyond
the person or his immediate surroundings and include those premises in his actual
possession and control. Of this Justice Frankfurter says "If upon arrest you may
search beyond the immediate person and the very restricted area that may fairly
be deemed part of the person, what national line can be drawn short of searchnig
as many rooms as arresting officers may deem appropriate for finding the fruits
of the crime?"2 5 If a small office or a four room apartment may be searched, why
not a whole house? Under the flexible test of reasonableness as promulgated by
the Court, that of course might not be so. Several of the reasons for holding the
search in the instant case reasonable were that the office was small and devoted
to a business use for which the public was invited, and the whole room was "under
the immediate and complete control" of the respondent.2 6 This is a strong indication that the Court will carefully scrutinize the scope of the search made, and perhaps draw a line far short of a whole residence. But since the reasonableness test
provides no concrete guide, the determination of this question must depend upon
future cases for an answer.
As yet however, there are no cases pending in the lower federal courts which
would give much aid. There have been three cases holding valid seizures of evidence
made in the immediate presence of the arrested person,27 and one upholding the
search of a car. 28 Best v. United States20 upholds the search without warrant of an
apartment in Vienna, Austria, made by military authorities some two weeks after
the accused had been arrested. Applying the reasonableness test and citing United
States v. Rabinowitz the court reasons that the chaotic conditions existing in that
city at the beginning of the occupation excused the authorities from the necessity
of procuring a search warrant.
The case of McKnight v. United Statesa° presents an interesting question quite
like that in the Trupiano case. Police officers allowed a suspect, for whom they had
an arrest warrant, to get by them and into a house where a lottery was being
carried on. They then broke in, arrested the suspect and seized all the evidence in
sight. The court decided that their apparent intention was the seizure and not the
25. United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U. S. 56, 79, (1950).
26. Id. at 64.
27. United States v. Spadafora, 181 F. 2d 957 (7th Cir. 1950) cert. denied
71 Sup. Ct. 234 (1950); Martin v. United States, 183 F. 2d 436 (4th Cir. 1950)
cert. denied 71 Sup. Ct. 280 (1950); United States v. Baxter, 89 Fed. Supp. 732
(E.D. Tenn. 1950).
28. United States v. Roberts, 90 Fed. Supp. 718 (E. D. Tenn. 1950).
29. 184 F. 2d 131 (1st Cir. 1950).
30. 183 F. 2d 977 (D. D. C. 1950).
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arrest; that such "police stratagem" was unreasonable and, therefore unconstitutional. The opinion shows some reluctance to break away from the spirit of the Trupiano
decision; a reluctance shared by many, and set forth at length by the dissenting
justices in the principal case.
Justice Frankfurter finds little value in a test which requires a search without
warrant to be reasonable and provides no further criterion as a guide. "It is no
guide at all either for a jury or for district judges or the police to say that an
'unreasonable search' is forbidden-that a search must be reasonable." 3' He would
interpret the amendment in the light of the history that gave rise to its enactment,
and the dangers to free society from unrestrained police action untempered with
prior judicial scrutiny. He would bar every search without warrant except where
there is a good exxcuse for. not getting one, that is to say searches that are based
on absolute necessity.
"The test by which searches and seizures 'must be judged is whether
conduct is consonant with the main aim of the Fourth Amendment. The
main aim of the Fourth Amendment is against the invasion of the right
of privacy as to one's effects and papers without regard to the result of such
invasion. The purpose of the Fourth Amendment was to assure that the
existence of probable cause as the legal basis for making a search was to be
only
determined by a judicial officer before arrest and not after, subject
32
to what is necessarily to be excepted from such requirement."
The questions presented in this case do not appear to be foreclosed from further consideration. Let us hope that such questions are resolved on a sounder basis
than that feared by Justice Frankfurter, i.e. "unexpected changes in the courts composition and the contingencies in the choice of successions."
WILLIAM B. ANDERSON
INCOME TAX-PARTNERSHIPS WITH PROVISION FOR CONTINUATION OF PARTNERSHIP
UPON DEATH OF PARTNER-ALLOCATION OF INCOME AT DEATH

Commissioner ol Internal Revenue v. Mnookin's Estate'
Samuel Mnookin and his son were partners in the retail clothing and jewelry
business. The partnership was created and engaged in business in Missouri. The
partnership agreement provided that upon the death of a partner neither the
partnership nor the interest of the deceased partner should terminate, but that
the surviving partner should carry on the business of the partnership until the
interest of the deceased partner was distributed to his heirs, legatees or trusts
beneficiaries.
Samuel Mnookin kept his own books and filed his own income tax returns
on the basis of the calendar year. The partnership kept its books and filed its
income tax returns on the basis of a fiscal year ending on May 31.
31. United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U. S. 56, 83 (1950).
32. Id. at 80.
1. 184 F. 2d 89 (8th Cir. 1950).
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On December 1, 1943 Samuel Mnookin died. The surviving partner continued the business without interruption and without change of the manner of
keeping the books or the time or basis for filing partnership returns. There was no
distribution of Mnookin's estate until March 15, 1945.
The Commissioner of Internal Revenue claimed that death terminated the
partnership, hence ended its taxable year, and that the deceased's share of the
income of the business from May 31, 1943 until December 1, 1943 became income
to deceased upon his death and should be included in his individual income for
the period January 1, 1943 to December 1, 1943.
The executrix of the estate contended that death did not terminate the partnership, did not end its taxable year and that the deceased's share of the partnership income was not taxable as his individual income until the end of the current
fiscal year of the partnership, May 31, 1944, and therefore this income was not
properly includible in decedent's income tax return for the period January 1 to
December 1, 1943.
The Tax Court of the United States sustained the contention of the executrix,2 and that decision was affirmed by the United States Court of Appeals, Eighth
Circuit.
Section 188 of the Internal Revenue Code provides:
"If the taxable year of a partner is different from that of the partnership,
the inclusions with respect to the net income of the partnership, in computing the net income of the partner for his taxable year, shall be based
upon the net income of the partnership for any taxable year of the partnership (whether beginning on, before, or after January 1, 1939) ending
within or with the taxable year of the partner." (Italics added)
The italicized portion of the section quoted above gave rise to the major issue
of the case-when did the taxable year of the partnership end? To answer this
question it was necessary to first decide if effect can be given to a provision in
the partnership agreement that death will not terminate the partnership until
distribution of the deceased's estate.
The court held that under the Missouri law such a provision was effective
where the "agreement clearly manifests the intention that the partnership continue
and not terminate upon the death of a partner." Only two cases were cited 3 to
support this proposition and neither of them was discussed. A careful reading
of these two and other Missouri cases discloses that perhaps the court was not
as thorough" as it could have been in its analysis of the Missouri law as to
,the effectiveness of such a provision.4 It seems clear, however, that at least
2. 12 T. C. 744 (1949).
3. Edwards v. Thomas, 66 Mo. 468, 481 (1877); Hidden v. Edwards, 313
Mo. 642, 285 S.W. 462 (1926).
4. No attempt is made to analyze or reconcile the following cases; they are
merely called to the reader's attention as some of the cases that have purported
to decide the question of whether or not such a provision in a partnership agreement will be given affect.
In Edwards v. Thomas, supra note 3,'the partnership agreement provided:
"that in the event of the death of either party to the agreement, the co-parthttps://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol16/iss3/8
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as far as the application of the Internal Revenue Code is concerned an agreement
that the partnership will not terminate upon the death of a partner is valid and
will be given effect.
With this as their premise the court simply applied the express language of
Section 188 of the Internal Revenue Code and held that the deceased's share of
the income earned by the partnership between the date of the partnership's last
accounting period, May 31, and the death of the partner, December 1, was not
taxable as deceased's individual income for the period from January 1 to December
1, 1943.
The facts in Girard Trust Co. v. United States,5 were not significantly different from the facts in the Mnookin case. In the Girard case the court held that
nership should not, on that account, be dissolved, but the interest of such
deceased party should be continued and represented by the legal representative
of such deceased party."
Upon the death of one of the partners his widow was appointed to administer his
estate. At the foot of the partnership agreement she made and signed the following memorandum: "I approve and accept the above." It is said the court held
that the partnership was not dissolved by the death of a partner.
This proposition was reiterated, though it was dictum, in the case of Hidden
v. Edwards, .rupra, note 3.
In Hax v. Barnes, 98 Mo. App. 707, 73 S.W. 928 (K. C. Ct. of App. 1903)
the provision was:
"In case of the death of any one of the partners during the continuance of
this contract, the business shall not on account thereof be discontinued, but
the interest of said partner shall be kept in the business and the same shall be
continued by the surviving partners, and the administrator, or executor of such
deceased until the expiration of the time agreed upon."
One of the partners died and his legal representatives were sued for contribution
for a contract liability which arose after his death. The court held that the representatives had to contribute. They said:
"Ordinarily, the death of a partner puts an end to the partnership, except
for certain necessary purposes in winding up its affairs. .

.

. But a partner

may by contract provide for a continuation of the partnership business after
his death, and that the interest of his estate therein shall not cease."
"The fact remains that the partnership survived the death of Burnes."
To the same effect was the case of E. R. Hawkins & Co. v. Quinette, 156 Mo.
App. 153, 136 S.W. 246 (1911). But see Exchange Bank v. Tracy, 77 Mo. 594,
599 (1883).
If the partnership agreement containing such a provision was made prior to
the passage of the Uniform Partnership Act in 1949 and the death occurred after
its passage will the provision be given effect? Section 358.040-5, Mo. Rav. STAT.
(1949), provides that the act shall not be construed to impair the obligations of
any contract. See Gerding v. Baier, 143 Md. 520, 122 At]. 675 (1923).
With regard to agreements containing such a provision it will be observed
that Section 358.310-4, Mo. REv. STAT. (1949), says that dissolution is caused by
the death of any partner. Apparently there are no Missouri cases at this date
construing this statute. However this same section of the Uniform Partnership
Act has been construed by other courts as not applying if the partnership agreement provides that there will be no dissolution upon the death of a partner.
Pailthorpe v. Tailman, 87 N.Y.S. 2d 822 (Sup. Ct. 1949), affirmed 93 N.Y.S.
2d 712, 276 A pp. Div. 823 (4th Dept., 1949), said that dissolution by death
of a member is controlled by partnership law only in absence of a particular agreement on the subject made by the partners themselves. Also see Gerding v. Baier,
supra. The writer was unable to find any cases to the contrary.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1951
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"a taxable year of the partnership did not end with the death of partner Samuel
Kentworthy." Continuing, Judge Hastie pointed out that for purposes of administering the Internal Revenue Code a partner is treated as earning partnership income not as it comes into the partnership from day to day, but rather
as a periodic partnership accounting may reveal partnership profit or loss and
individual shares thereof. The fact that a partner dies does not alter the statutory plan which set up such a procedure.
The wisdom of the decisions in the Girard and M-nookin cases is manifest.
Prior to the partner's death his individual income tax return for a given year,
for example, 1942, would, under Section 188, Internal Revenue Code, include income received by the partnership from the end of its fiscal year in 1941, for example, May 31, 1941, until the end of its fiscal year in 1942. Thus his individual
taxable income for 1942 would include the partnership's income for the last seven
months of 1941, and the first five months of 1942, but it would not include the
partnership's income for the last seven months of 1942.
If, as the Commissioner of Internal Revenue has contended, because of the
partner's death on December 1 1943, the partnership's income from the date of
its last accounting period, May 31, 1943, until the date of the partner's death
were includible as the partner's individual income for the first eleven months of
1943, the effect would be to pyramid into the partner's individual taxable income
for these first eleven months of 1943 his share of the income earned by the partnership from May 31, 1942, until December 1, 1943, a total of eighteen months.
This, of course, would push his income into a higher tax bracket and subject him
to tax rates which were intended to apply only to those whose incomes were as
great in twelve months as his was in eighteen months.
Decisions contrary to those of the Girard and Mnookin cases may be foundo
but it is extremely significant that in none of those cases did the court's decision
result in pyramiding income for more than a twelve-month period.
JOHN DAVID COLLINS

PROPERTY-REMAINDERS-CLASS

GIFTS-IMPLICAION

OF REMAINDERS

ST. Louis Union Trast Co. v.Hamilton'

The St. Louis Union Trust Co. brought an action for. the construction of a
trust indenture in which it was trustee. The indenture provided that the income
should be accumulated until the settlor's death, at which time one-fourth was
to be further accumulated, and three-fourths was to be divided among his nieces,
A. B. and C. D., his nephew, E. F., and Bertha, the widow of a deceased nephew.
5. 182 F. 2d 921 (3rd Cir. 1950).
6. Darcy v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 26 B.T.A. 841 (1932)
affirmed 290 U. S.705 (1934); Beverly W. Smith, 26 B.T.A. 778 (1932), appeal
d&nzissed, 67 F. 2d 167 (4th Cir. 1933); Clarence B. Davison, 20 B.T.A. 856
(1930), affirmed per curiam, 54 F. 2d 1077 (2d Cir. 1931).
1. 235 S.W. 2d 241 (Mo. 1951).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol16/iss3/8
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It was expressly provided that should any of his beneficiaries die before the termination of the trust his or her share of income was to go to his or hed descendants
(in case of Bertha dying or remarrying, to the descendants of the deceased nephew).
It was also expressly provided that the share of income of any beneficiary dying
without descendants was to go over to the surviving beneficiaries.
The indenture further provided that upon the termination of the trust ...
the
entire corpus of the trust estate and undistributed income shall be paid over and
distributed unto [A. B., C. D., E. F., Bertha, etc., twelve named individuals] and
unto the descendants of such of them as may have died prio rto such time." There
was a provision for a gift over to the surviving beneficiaries should Bertha die or
remairy before the termination of the trust not survived by descendants of the
deceased nephew. In the event of a complete failure of beneficiaries to survive
to the termination of the trust there was a gift over the whole corpus and undistributed income to two named hospitals.
Four corpus beneficiaries died before the termination of the trust. Two of
them were no tsurvived by descendants. The major issue in this case involved the
right to succeed to the share, if any, of these two corpus beneficiaries who died without descendants. There was also a question presented as to the distribution of
the share of income of one of the income beneficiaries but the court had little
difficulty in interpreting2 the trust indenture which was very clear, as to the disposition of income in all situations.
The Attorney-General was made a defendant because under the Trading
with the Enemy Act he succeeded to the interest, if any, of the two corpus beneficiaries (German Nationals) who died without descendants. He contended that
each deceased beneficiary had a vested remainder and that it was not divested
by the death of the beneficiary without descendants since there was no provision
for succession to the share of any beneficiary who died without descendants.3 The
surviving named beneficiaries contended that all were contingent remaindermen
and those who survived the termination of the trust should take the whole corpus
and undistributed income as this was a class gift and they were the surviving
members of the class.&
The Missouri Supreme Court held that there was a class gift saying, "...
it is
our conclusion settlor intended a gift to his 'relatives therein named' (and Bertha)

2. In ATKINSON, WILLS § 265 (1937), there is a clear explanation of the
difference between interpretation and construction.

3. 2

FEARNE, REMAINDERS,

§ 380 (1844). "Where a conditional limitation is

limited in favor of unborn persons, or persons who shall answer a given description,
and no such persons come in esse or answer such description, the preceding estate
becomes absolute: because, although the express condition may have been fulfilled,
on which such estate is to go over, yet, as there is no one to whom it can go over,
according to the terms of the conditional limitation, it must of necessity remain
undivested by the fulfillment of the express condition." Gardner v. Vanlandingham, 334 Mo. 1054, 1066, 69 S.W. 2d 947, 953 (1934).
4. Scott v. Bargeman, 2 P. Wins. 69, 24 Eng. Rep. 643 (1722); Kingston v.
St. Louis Union Trust Co., 348 Mo. 448, 154 S.W. 2d 37 (1941).
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as a class, with a proviso that if there were a complete failure of the class, then the
hospitals were to take."
The gift of the corpus and undistributed income was to twelve named indidividuals. Prima facie, this creates a vested remainder of equal one-twelfth's. To
overcome this presumption there must be a clear indication of a contrary intent.
This was not a gift simply to "nieces and nephews." Neither was it a gift to "A,
and B, nieces and nephews," or to, "nieces and nephews, A and B." Furthermore,
these twelve named beneficiaries did not bear the same relationship to the settlor:
three were nieces and nephews; one was the widow of a deceased nephew; and the
remaining eight were grandnieces and grandnephews. In holding that the settlor
intended thes etwelve named beneficiaries to take as a class the court has gone further than any previous Missouri case in determining that a gift to named persons
is a class gift and not a gift to individuals. 7
As a theory alternative to a class gift theory, the court uses language to indicate that each of the twelve named beneficiaries and their descendents had a contingent remainder with a gift over to the surviving beneficiaries of any beneficiary
who died without descendants before the termination of the trust. By assuming
that there were contingent remainders, the court was still faced with the problem
of finding a gift over to the surviving beneficiaries. The court states that the gift
over to the hospitals on complete failure of beneficiaries "is a clear manifestation of
settlor's intention that undistributed income and corpus" is to be paid to the named
beneficiaries and their descendants "as long as one remains." But there are other
indications in the indenture, no tmentioned by the court, which would indicate
that the settlor had no such intention to create a gift over to the surviving beneficiaries. In providing for the distribution of income the trust indenture has an express provision for a gift over to the surviving beneficiaries of the share of any
beneficiary who dies without descendants before the termination of the trust. Further, in providing for the share of corpus that the widow, Bertha, is to take there
is an express gift over to the surviving beneficiaries should she die or remarry before
the termination of the trust not survived by descendants of the deceased nephew.
As to income there is complete express provision for a gift over. As to corpus the
provision for a gift over is partial only. By providing expressly for a gift over in
the part of the indenture dealing with income, and omitting such a provision from
the part dealing with the distribution of corpus, has not the settlor indicated that he
did not intend that there be a gift over to the surviving beneficiaries of the share of
a beneficiary who died without descendants before the termination of the trust?
5. Snow v. Ferril, 320 Mo. 543, 8 S.W. 2d 1008 (1934) ["my nieces and
nephews of the first degree," held a class gift].
6. Holloway v. Burke, 336 Mo. 380, 19 S.W. 2d 104 (1935) ["my full brothers
and sisters, A.B. and C.D. etc.," held a class gift].
7. 2 GILL, REAL PROPERTY LAw IN MissouRI 614 (1949). But see Walker v.
First Trust and Savings Bank, 12 F. 2d 896 (8th Cir. 1926). 75 A.L.R. 7S7, 105
A.L.R. 1394 have annotations on the problem of distinguishing class gifts and gifts
to individuals.
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Has not the settlor shown that he knows how to provide for a gift over if he intends
that there be one?
It would seem that the court might have reached the same result by applying
the "divide and pay over" rule, thereby avoiding the necessity of calling this gift to
named persons a class gift. Simes in his work on future interests states that the
"divide and pay over" rule may be applied when the gift is to individuals. 8
Had there been an express provision for the distribution of the share of corpus
of a beneficiary who died without descendants before the termination of the trust,
this law suit would never have come up. This situation was expressly provided
for as to income. It was omitted as to corpus. By not providing for a situation which
later arose it was necessary to supply an intention which might never have been
present. 9 The court was forced to strain to reach a desirable result. Although the
decision is not unsound it might be observed that had the opposite result been
reached there would be good authority to support it.
ALLAN H. STOCKER

PROPERTY-CONTINGENT REMAINDEAs-AIENABILITY

Ott v. Pikard'
In the 1946 case of Grimes v. Rush, 2 noted previously in the Missouri Law
Review,3 the basic limitation was "to A for life and then to the heirs of her. body."
A had three children. 'She and her three children quitclaimed by ordinary quitclaim deeds to the defendant's predeceasor in title. A died and the same three
children who had quitclaimed brought an action in ejectment on the theory that
they had a fee simple as heirs of the body of A. The Missouri Supreme Court held
that the children's contingent remainders had been effectively conveyed by the
ordinary quitclaim deeds, under Section 442.020, Missouri Revised Statutes (1949),
which provides that conveyances of lands, or of any estate or interest therein, may
8. 2 SIMES, FtrruRE INTERESTS, §§ 361 and 393 (1936); Shufeldt v. Shufeldt, 130 Wash. 253, 227 Pac. 6 (1924); 3 RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY § 260 says the
"divide and pay over" rule is in effect nullified by the exceptions thereto, and
neither the rule nor the exceptions are helpful in construing a limitation. For an
annotation on the "divide and pay over" rule as applied to individuals see 144
A.L.R. 1155, 1166.
Applying the "divide and pay over" rule would result in a contingency of survivorship; whether the surviving individuals would take the whole gift presents a
much more difficult problem than it does in a class gift.
9. In Boal v. Metropolitan Museum of Art of City of New York, 292 Fed.
303, 304 (S. D. N. Y. 1923) Learned Hand says, "I have to do with a situation
quite outside of anything which the testator had in contemplation, and it is therefore obvious that any solution is bound to be verbal and indeed formal. Yet while
it is idle to speculate upon what he personally would have done had he been able
to look ahead, courts have always permitted themselves, within limits, to impute to
testators an intent which they could not foresee."

1. 237 S.W. 2d 109 (Mo. 1951).
2.
3.

355 Mo. 573, 197 S.W. 2d 310 (1946).
12 Mo. L. REv. 218, 415 (1947).
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be made by deed. The court expressly rejected the argument that the deed must
be one capable of conveying an after-acquired title; the court pointed out that the
contingent remainders were present interests, not after-acquired interests. The
court distinguished the line of cases represented by Williams v. Reid 4 where the
interest was not a contingent remainder, but merely the possibility that an heir
apparent might inherit from a living person (or the possibility that a person might
take under the will of a living person).
Ott v. Pickard, a recent case involving basically the same problem, was decided without reference to Grimes v. Rush. Grimes v. Rush was not cited in either
brief, and the court does not cite the case. The limitation in question was to B
"to have and to hold during her life time only, and at her. death to descend to and
become the property of her heirs in fee-simple." B had four brothers and sisters
and they quitclaimed to B by an ordinary quitclaim deed, except that following the
description there was a recital:
"This deed is made to clear title to the above described lands owned
jointly by the grantors and grantee."
B married the plaintiff and died without ever having had issue, leaving as her only
heirs her four brothers and sisters. Plaintiff elected to take a fee in one-half as
statutory dower; he brought this action to try and determine title and for partition. The four brothers and sisters defended on the theory that the quitclaim deed
was ineffective to convey their contingent remainders and therefore B had a life
estate only. This is the theory upon which the trial court reached its judgment
in favor of the brothers and sisters. 5 Appellant contended that the quitclaim deed
was effective to convey the contingent remaindersO as after-acquired interests because of the "clear title" recital.
The Missouri Supreme Court followed the appellants theory and held that
this particular quitclaim deed with the special "clear title" recital was effective
to convey to B contingent remainders as after-acquired interests. The court
stated: ". . . we think the language of this deed shows that the grantors tried to
convey not only the title they had at the time of execution but any title they
might have in the future. . . . An ordinary quitclaim would7 have conveyed the
contingent remainder interest these grantors had when the deed was executed ...
this deed was more than an ordinary deed and we hold that this deed also conveyed
their after-acquired title ......
Because Grimes v..Ritsh was not cited in the principal case it is submitted that
the principal case should not be considered as weakening the doctrine that a contingent remainder of the fourth class may be conveyed by ordinary quitclaim deed
in Missouri. Grimes v. Ritsh was decided after both theories had been fully pre4.
5.
6.
properly
7.
opinion.

37 S.W. 2d 537 (Mo. 1931).
Appellant's brief, p. 9.
Appellant also argued that the remainders were vested. The court
rejected this construction.
The word "not" may have been omitted at this point in printing the

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol16/iss3/8

14

et al.: Masthead and Recent Cases

1951]

RECENT CASES

sented to the court. Grimres v. Rush has been cited with approval in three subsequent Missouri cases." Its authority has not been questioned. There is no reason
to think that the court would have departed from Grimes v. Rusk had counsel
cited that case to the court. 9
ALLAN H. STOCKER
TRUSTs-DEvIATION BY COURT PEUVMISSIoN-LEGAL TRUST

IN ESTMENTs IN MISSOURI

St. Louis Union Trust Co. v. GhioAppolonio P. Ghio, who died in 1920, provided for an express private trust in
his will in which he directed the testamentary trustee, St. Louis Union Trust Co., to
invest the proceeds received from the sale of specified real estate "in real estate, first
mortgage notes or good bonds bearing interest at not less than four per cent per
annum." In 1949 an inflated market existed making substantially improcurable the
above specified types of investments at 4% interest per annum without exposing

the corpus of the trust to undue risks. The trustee brought this suit in equity praying that the court instruct it as whether to deviate from the terms of the trust by
investing only in the specified types of securities at 2.6% to 3.5% interest, or by

investing in "other good and legal property and securities, including debentures and
sound preferred and common stocks" which will reasonably bring a return of 4%.

The contingent remaindermen2 contended that deviating from the specific types
of investments named in the instrument creating the trust might tend to jeopardize
the safety of the corpus. The St. Louis Court of Appeals, affirming the judgment
of the circuit court, held that the trustee may deviate from the terms of the trust
by court permission where unforeseen conditions which may defeat the trustor's
purpose arise after execution of the instrument creating the trust, and in such cases
the court will authorize the trustee to act in such a manner as the court believes
the trustor would have authorized had he foreseen such a change in conditions.
According to the court's construction of the will the trustor was primarily concerned with obtaining a 4% return for the income beneficiaries and only secondarily
concerned with the specified types of securities to be purchased, and the court therefore authorized the trustee to procure such investments bearing 4% interest as are
proper under the laws of Missouri.
8. Brown v. Bibb, 356 Mo. 148, 201 S.W. 2d 370 (1947); Tapley v. Dill,
358 Mo. 824, 217 S.W. 2d 369 (1949); Munday v. Austin, 358 Mo. 959, 218 S.W.
2d 624 (1949).
9. It should be noted that in Grimes v. Rush and similar cases the contingent
remainderman is conveying to a person who has a vested interest in the land,
namely as a life tenant. Query, as a matter of public policy, whether such a contingent remainder, should be alienable to a stranger who had no other interest in
the property. Such a conveyance, as a practical matter, would not further the
free alienability of the land.
1. 222 S.W. 2d 556 (Mo. App. 1949).
2. See Lang v. Mississippi Valley Trust Co., 359 Mo. 688, 223 S.W. 2d 404
(1949), as to relative rights of life beneficiaries and contingent remaindermen.
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Generally it is the trustee's duty to comply implicitly with the trustor's manifested intentions where they are clear and capable of being carried out.3 But it is
well established in Missouri,' and generally recognized elsewhere,5 that a court of
equity may authorize a trustee to deviate from the terms of the trust where there
arises a change of circumstances not anticipated by the trustor and compliance with
the specific terms of the trust under the changed circumstances would tend to defeat
or substantially impair the purpose of the trust." The deviation must be by court
permission; 7 otherwise the deviation will constitute a breach of trust as unauthorized conduct and the trustee will be liable for losses occurring as a result of such
deviation. 8
Where the instrument creating the trust, as in the principal case, requires two
standards to be satisfied, and unforseen conditions arise making it impossible to
satisfy both standards without defeating the purpose of the trust, the question as to
which standard the court will authorize the trustee to follow depends upon a construction of the instrument creating the trust as to which standard was of primary
concern to the settlor.9 In the New York case of In Re Colh's Estate0 the trust

3. Coleman v. Lill, 191 S.W. 2d 1018 (Mo. App. 1945); In Re Stack's Will,
217 Wis. 94, 258 N.W. 324, 97 A.L.R. 316 (1935).
4. Seigle v. First National Co., 338 Mo. 417, 431, 90 S.W. 2d 776, 781, 105
A.L.R. 181 (1936) (approved by the principal case).
5. Hoffman v. First Bond & Mortgage Co. of Hartford, 116 Conn. 320, 164
At. 656 (1933); Porter v. Porter, 138 Me. 1, 20 A. 2d 465 (1941); New Jersey
National Bank & Trust Co. v. Lincoln Mortgage & Title Guaranty Co., 105 N. J.
Eq. 557, 148 At. 713 (1930); In Re Cohn's Estate, 158 Misc. 96, 285 N. Y. Supp.

279 (Surr. Ct. 1936); 3

BOGERT, TRUSTS AND TRusTEEs,

Part 1, Secs. 561, 362 (2d

ed. 1946); 2 Scotr, TRUSTS, Sec. 167 (1939).
6. As to the power of a court of equity to authorize a deviation from the
specific terms of the trust, see Brunswick, The Court Moves The Dead Hand, 15
CHi-KENT L. REv. 24 (1936); note, 20 MINN. L. REv. 447 (1936); note, 22 VA. L.
REv. 596 (1936); note, 77 A.L.R. 971 (1932); note, 80 A.L.R. 117 (1932).
7. T. J. Moss Tie Co. v. Wabash Railway Co., 11 F. Supp. 277, 285 (S.D. N.
Y. 1935); Porter v. Porter, 138 Me. 1, 20 A. 2d 465 (1941); Seigle v. First National

Co., 338 Mo. 417, 431, 90 S.W. 2d 776, 781 (1936);

RESTATEMENT, TRUSTS,

Sec. 167

(1935). But the principal case and the Seigle case, supra, must be distinguished from
cases in which a construction of the instrument creating the trust indicates that the
settlor intended that the trustee should have the right to vary from the specific directions in the trust instrument. In the later type of case the trustee is authorized by
the instrument creating the trust, and hence court permission is unnecessary, though
advisable. Loud v. Union Trust Co., 313 Mo. 552, 281 S.W. 744 (1926); Seigle v.
First National Co., supra, dictum; Toronto General Trusts Co. v. Chicago, B. &
Q. R.R., 64 Hun 1, 18 N. Y. Supp. 593 (Sup. Ct. 1892), affirmed without opinion,
138 N. Y. 657, 34 N.E. 514 (1893); 2 Scorr, TRUSTS, § 167 (1939). Deviation is
also allowed without permission of court where there is impossibility of compliance
with the terms of the trusts, or where the specific terms of the trust are contrary
to public policy or are illegal, or where there is a change in circumstances whereby
a compliance with the specific terms of the trust would tend to defeat or substantially impair the purpose of the trust and there exists a necessity for immediate
action on the part of the trustee. But even here court permission is advisable to
protect the trustee from liability. 2 ScoTT, supra, § 167.1.
8. 2 ScoTT, TRUSTS, §§ 167.2, 201, 205 (1939).
9. 2 Scorr, TRUSTS, § 165 (1939).
10. 158 Misc. 96, 285 N. Y. Supp. 279 (Surr. Ct. 1936).
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instrument provided that investment should be made in "legally authorized investments" and that no security should be purchased which did not yield an income of
at least 5%. Legally authorized trust investments in New York at that time were
confined to a statutory "list,""2 and in In Re Mvller's Wil is was held that the
statutes constituting this list were a part of the public policy of the state and that
the court had no power. to authorize a deviation from this list.12 Professor Scott
suggests that the provision in the trust instrument requiring legally authorized investments implied that the safety of the principal was of primary concern to the
settlor. 13 Therefore in the Cohn case the court authorized the trustee to invest
only in legally authorized investments even though the return was less than 5%.
The principal case, however, is distinguishable from In Re Cohlns Estate on both the
4
ground that Missouri has no statutory legal list of authorized trust investments
and as to the language of the trust instrument. In the principal case the settlor's
will created two trusts, a trust of personality and a trust of the proceeds of realty.
The terms of the trust of personalty did not require a minimum income to be derived but did caution the trustee to keep in mind the safety of the principal. In
the trust of the proceeds of realty, the one in question in the principal case, the
settlor made no provision regarding the safety of the principal other than specifying the particular types of investments to be made, but he did require at least a
4% return for the income beneficiaries. The court held that the omission of the precautionary provision in the trust as to the proceeds of realty and the imposition of
a specific income to be derived from the trust of the proceeds of realty "indicates
very persuasively" that the settlor was primarily concerned with obtaining a 4%
return for the income beneficiaries. The court found that the whole tenor. of the will
supported such a conclusion.
The court in the present case authorized the trustee to "procure such investments bearing 4% interest as are proper under the laws of this state." This presents
the problem of what constitute legal trust investments in Missouri. Some states
have a statutory "list" of the only types of investments considered as proper trust
investments in the particular jurisdiction.15 This, however, seems undesirable as
being too inflexible, and tends to defeat the purpose of the trust in an emergency
situation such as exists in the principal case. Missouri has a few statutes which
make certain investments by trustees permissive (such as bonds issued by national
11. N. Y. DECED. EsT. LAW § 111; N. Y. PERS. PROP. LAW § 21; N. Y. BANK
§§ 14(1), 97. However, these statutes have recently undergone vast changes.
N. Y. Laws 1950, c. 464, §§ 1, 5.
12. 155 Misc. 748, 280 N. Y. Supp. 345 (Surr. Ct. 1935). It semes highly
doubtful whether this case is still law in New York today in view of N. Y. Laws
1950, c. 464, § 21(1) (n).
13. 2 ScoTT, TRusTs § 165 (1939).
14. See note 20, infra.
15. Supra, note 11. See also ORE. CoMP. LAws ANN. § 20-1214 (1940), as
amended by Ore. Laws 1943, c. 109, repealed by Ore. Laws 1947, c. 523. It seems
that the recent trend is toward repealing statutory lists in favor of the prudence rule
of trust investments. For. other states having a statutory list see 3 BOGERT, TRuSTS
AND TRUSTEES, Part 2, §§ 616-663 (2d ed. 1946).
LAW
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mortgage associations or the federal housing administrator,16 bonds or. notes secured
by deeds of trust or mortgages insured by the administrator,17 and other types of
bonds, 18 etc.)1 9 but they do not constitute an exclusive "list" prohibiting other
types of investments.20 The general rule, in the absence of statutory provisions and

specific provisions in the instrument creating the trust, is that the trustee may
make "such investments as a prudent man would make of his own property having
primarily in view the preservation of the estate and the amount and regularity of
the income to be derived." 21 Missouri follows the general rule, 22 which has been
called the "prudence rule of trust investments." This rule requires the trustee to
exercise a reasonable degree of care, 22 skill,24 and caution 25 in selecting investments.
But he is not allowed to engage in speculative investments. 26 There are two lines
of authority regarding application of the prudence rule of trust investments: the
New York or more strict view which holds that a trustee may not invest trust funds
in common or preferred stocks, and permits investment only in government securities and first mortgages on real estate; and the Massachusetts or more liberal view
which holds that corporate stocks -may constitute a proper trust investment. 27 Until
1940 it was very doubtful as to which view Missouri courts followed, 28 but in

16.
17.
18.
19.

Mo. REv. STAT. Sec. 362.185 (1949).
Ibid.
Mo. REv. STAT. Secs. 108.240, 108.290 (1949).
For a listing of Mo. REv. STAT. (1939) applicable to trust investments
see 3 BOGERT, TRUSTS AND TRusmEs, § 639 (2d ed. 1946). Note, however, that
Mo. REv. STAT. § 8218 (1939) was repealed in Mo. Laws 1945 p. 1578. For a
discussion of Mo. REv. STAT. (1929) and Missouri decisions applicable to trust
investments see Eaton and Cameron, Investment Authority of a Missouri Trustee,
5 KAN. CITy L. REv. 225 (1937). For a discussion of Mo. REv. STAT. (1919) and
Missouri decisions see Grimm, Legal Investments for Trusts Funds in Missouri,
14 ST. Louis L. REv. 277 (1929).

20. Rand v. McKittrick, 346 Mo. 466, 142 S.W. 2d 29 (1940); St. Louis Union

Trust Co. v. Toberman, 235 Mo. App. 559, 140 S.W. 2d 68 (1940), transferred

345 Mo. 613, 134 S.W. 2d 45 (1939).
21. 2 ScOrr, TRusTs § 227, p. 1197 (1939); see also Harvard College v.
Armory, 9 Pick. 446, 461 (Mass. 1830); King v. Talbot, 40 N. Y. 76, 85 (1869).
22. Rand v. McKittrick, 346 Mo. 466, 142 S.W. 2d 29 (1940); St. Louis
Union Trust Co. v. Toberman, 235 Mo. App. 559, 140 S.W. 2d 68 (1940), trans.
ferred 345 Mo. 613, 134 S.W. 2d 45 (1939); Covey v. Pierce, 229 Mo. App. 424,
82 S.W. 2d 592 (193,5); Comet v. Comet, 269 Mo. 298, 190 S.W. 333 (1916);
Drake v. Crane, 127 Mo. 85, 29 S.W. 990 (1895).
23. St. Louis Union Trust Co. v. Toberman, 235 Mo. App. 559, 140 S.W. 2d
68 at 72 (1940); 2 ScOrr, TRusTs, § 227.1 (1939).
24. Comet v. Comet, 269 Mo. 298, 190 S.W. 333 at 339 (1916); 2 Scorr,
TRusTs § 227.2 (1939).
25. St. Louis Union Trust Co. v. Toberman, 235 Mo. App. .59, 140 S.W. 2d
68 at 74 (1940); 2 Scor, TRusTs § 227.3 (1939).
26. Comet v. Comet, 269 Mo. 298, 190 S.W. 333 (1916) (leading case);
Covey v. Pierce, 229 Mo. App. 424, 82 S.W. 2d 592 (1935); Loud v. St. Louis
Union Trust Co., 313 Mo. 552, 281 S.W. 744 (1925).
27. 2 Scorr, TRUsTs, § 227.5 (1939); 65 C.J., TRusTs §§ 676, 683.
28. See Eaton and Cameron, Investment Authority of a Missouri Trustee,
5 KAN. CiTr L. REv. 225 (1937).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol16/iss3/8

18

et al.: Masthead and Recent Cases

19511

RECENT CASES
29

Rand v. McKittrick

the Missouri Supreme Court expressly adopted the more

liberal Massachusetts view as followed by the Restatement of Tmsts.80 The court,
after. examining cases under both applications of the rule and finding that trust
funds under the New York view fared no better than those under the Massachusetts
view, held that it is not expedient or advisable to arbitrarily classify securities as
unfit for trust investments. The court emphasized that "preservation of trust
estates depends more upon the integrity, honesty and business acuman of the trustees than it does upon arbitrary legal classification of securities wherein trust funds
may be invested." The principal case illustrates the advantage in the flexibility of
the more liberal application of the prudence rule of trust investments (aided by
permissive statutes) over the more strict application of the rule and over statutory
exclusive "lists."
LEoNAm A. ONEAL

29. 346 Mo. 466, 142 S.W. 2d 29 (1940). See also St. Louis Union Trust Co.
v. Toberman, 235 Mo. App. 5, 9, 140 S.W. 2d 68 (1940). However, a trust company
cannot invest trust funds held by it in its own capital stock. Mo. REv. STAT:
§ 368.070 (1949).
30. RESTATEMENT, TRUSTS § 227(1), p. 651, Sec. 227(e), p. 647 (1935).
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